September, 1996
SECTION: FEATURE
LENGTH: 5374 words
HEADLINE: FEMA Money! Come & Get It!;
  Reinventing disaster, Bill Clinton has turned the decrepit FEMA agency into
  another arm of his permanent campaign.
BYLINE: James Bovard; 
  James Bovard, the author of Lost Rights and Shakedown: How Government Screws
  You From A to Z, is the 1996 Warren Brookes Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise
  Institute.
 BODY:
  
  "Disasters are very political events."
  --FEMA Director James Witt, congressional testimony, April 30, 1996
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  
  When massive flooding struck the Midwest in July 1993, Bill Clinton cut short
  his Hawaii vacation to visit the flood victims in Iowa. In the words of ABC
  News's Brit Hume, Clinton journeyed to the region to play the role of
  "comforter_almost the national chaplain to those in distress." Both 
  the New York
  Times and USA Today showed the merciful president on their front pages hugging 
  a
  woman as she cried on his shoulder. Clinton backed up that mercy with money,
  promising Midwesterners $2.5 billion in aid from the Federal Emergency
  Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal programs. He later increased his
  offer to more than $4 billion--but when asked if his generosity would mean
  higher taxes, Clinton emphatically denied it. "No, no," he announced. 
  "This is a
  one-shot, one-time expenditure that will slightly increase this year's deficit. 
  
  But this year's deficit will still be much smaller than we thought it was going 
  
  to be in January, so we can manage it."
 The response was typical Clinton, and typically deceitful--government can
  give away billions of dollars and yet not burden taxpayers. The president has
  used that approach nowhere more than with FEMA, which under his administration
  has become renowned for its generosity. Whether paying for snow plowing in West 
  
  Virginia, or offering cut-rate insurance to flood zones, or announcing the
  spending of almost $800,000 in response to arson attacks on Southern black
  churches, FEMA is giving new meaning to the term "walking around money."
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  In the minds of the Clinton administration, FEMA's generosity is reinvented
  government at its finest. "FEMA is now a model disaster relief agency," 
  Clinton 
  declared in February, "and in some corners thought to be by far the most
  successful part of the Federal Government today." The agency even won the 
  1996
  Federal Public Service Excellence Award--presented by Reinvention Man himself,
  Al Gore. The Washington Monthly is calling FEMA's recent performance "the 
  most
  dramatic success story of the federal government in recent years."
 What's been reinvented at FEMA, however, is the idea of federal giveaways 
  as 
  a political tool. No president has exploited the political possibilities of 
  the 
  agency as shrewdly as Clinton has. His FEMA even began a newspaper, Recovery
  Times, to be distributed to residents of federally declared disaster areas. 
  As
  Clinton told constituents in the June 17, 1996 West Virginia edition of the
  paper:
  I assure you that in the weeks and months to come, your government will continue
  to support you in your efforts to rebuild your lives and communities. We will
  be with you, along with our state partners, for as long as it takes to help 
  you 
  on the road to recovery.
 That road is paved with FEMA gold.
  
  FEMA was the brainchild of Jimmy Carter, who announced plans in 1978 to form 
  a
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  federal agency to cope with disasters. Before 1950, other than sporadic flood
  and other disaster relief provided by Congress in special appropriations bills, 
  
  there was no consistent federal relief effort. That year, however, Congress
  passed a law giving the president the power and discretion to determine when 
  a
  disaster had occurred and how much aid Washington would provide. From that point
  on, federal disaster involvement slowly expanded until March 30, 1979, when
  President Carter, spurred to action by the Three Mile Island nuclear debacle,
  issued an executive order to create FEMA. The new agency was to be an amalgam 
  of
  the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, the Federal Disaster Assistance
  Administration, the Federal Preparedness Agency, the Federal Insurance
  Administration, and the National Fire and Control Administration.
 Within just five weeks, the Washington Post was reporting that the new agency
  was already a shambles: "The air is thick with memos, counter-memos and
  criticisms alleging that the new anti-disaster agency is on the verge of
  becoming a disaster itself."
 From 1979 to the late 1980's, FEMA stumbled from one boondoggle to the next. 
  
  It carried out the Environmental Protection Agency's infamous buyout of all 
  the 
  homes in Times Beach, Missouri--after the EPA had mistakenly concluded that
  trace elements of dioxin in some of the dirt in town were a deadly threat.
  Press coverage of FEMA during these years was pretty much summarized by this
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  1984 New York Times headline, "A Disaster Agency's Image Disaster." 
  For a time, 
  the agency was headed by Louis Giuffrida, an Ed Meese crony who gained brief
  notoriety for accepting $2,000 in free tickets to attend a George Bush
  fundraiser--tickets purchased by a FEMA contractor who then billed the agency
  for the expense.
 In 1988, the last year of the Reagan presidency, Congress enacted the
  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which stipulated that
  requests for federal assistance be based on a finding that the incident "is 
  of
  such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities
  of the State and the affected local governments and that federal assistance 
  is
  necessary." That act was to set the stage for the flow of money to come, 
  for
  neither federal law nor FEMA regulations provided a clearer definition of a
  disaster; the new vague language meant that a disaster was whatever an incumbent
  politician said it was.
 Not surprisingly, the "disaster rate" multiplied almost overnight. 
  The number
  of declared disasters and emergencies rose from an average of twenty-five a 
  year
  from 1983 to 1988 to an average of forty-one a year from 1989 through 1994. 
  In
  1992, the Bush administration set a record for the number of disaster
  declarations with forty-eight--almost three times more than in Reagan's last
  twelve months.
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  But the event that truly transformed the agency into a federal behemoth was
  Hurricane Andrew, which devastated southern Florida in August 1992. Though the
  storm left an estimated 160,000 people homeless, and destroyed or damaged 82
  ,000 businesses, Gov. Lawton Chiles initially refused to request federal aid 
  to 
  clean up the $30 billion worth of damage (far greater than the figure for the
  Northridge, California earthquake of 1994). It was not until Bush Transportation
  Secretary Andrew Card implored Chiles to request FEMA assistance that the
  governor asked for the region to be declared a disaster area.
 Bush honored the request, but the agency proceeded to bungle the relief
  effort. For several days, thousands of people were left searching for food and
  water. Victims of the storm quickly resorted to gallows humor, posting makeshift
  signs in front of their ruined homes: "What do George Bush and Hurricane 
  Andrew 
  have in common? They're both natural disasters." Even a visit to Florida 
  by FEMA
  board member Marilyn Quayle was not enough to reverse public opinion.
 The political debacle for Bush gave rise to calls to abolish FEMA, which
  resonated with the apathy and incompetence that doomed much of his
  administration. Bush had treated the agency as a political dumping ground;
  Wallace Stickney, Bush's FEMA chief, apparently got the job largely as a result 
  
  of being a neighbor and crony to John Sununu. Bush failed to see what could 
  be
  won or lost politically by taking the agency's mission seriously--a typical
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  lack of savvy for his presidency.
  
  Just as typical has been his successor's shrewd manipulation of the FEMA
  machine. Clinton had a reputation as governor of Arkansas for responding rapidly
  to emergencies, and was far too smart a political animal to pass up the chance
  to distribute money, buy votes, and accrue great photo opportunities in one 
  fell
  swoop. He has elevated the agency head, James Lee Witt, to cabinet status,
  insuring Witt--and thus an image of Clinton's generosity and compassion --high
  visibility in the national press.
 A small businessman who later became the chief judge in Yell County, Arkansas
  , Witt has been a regular on NBC's "Today" show, and frequently comments 
  on
  public events that have nothing whatsoever to do with disaster relief. Witt
  opined that the South's recent church burnings "have struck at the very 
  fabric
  of our nation," and he recommended all-night vigil prayer services as a 
  way to
  "eliminate some of this." In July he flew to New York to be the president's
  "eyes and ears" during the recovery of the victims' bodies of TWA 
  Flight 800.
  When a GAO report last May urged FEMA to tighten its spending guidelines, Witt
  responded: "The more FEMA attempts to tighten eligibility by closely prescribing
  every possibility, the more we will appear bureaucratic and inflexible." 
  The
  agency likes to boast of its therapeutic value; in an agency flyer promoting
  FEMA's "significant accomplishments," the first achievement listed 
  is
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  "increas[ing] the comfort level of citizens around the country_"
 Clinton's magnanimous therapy, however, has been far more than just a PR
  gimmick; his administration has delivered over $25 billion in disaster aid, 
  $7
  billion of it from FEMA alone. Dozens of federal agencies have jumped on the
  disaster bandwagon, ranging from the Small Business Administration (with its
  notorious low-interest disaster loans that have a 30 percent default rate) and
  the Veterans Administration to the Department of Health and Human Services
  (which sends its experts in to provide "crisis counseling") and the 
  Army Corps
  of Engineers.
 In 1993, just his first year in office, Clinton broke Bush's record by
  declaring fifty-eight disasters, and FEMA will almost certainly set another 
  mark
  this year, having already named fifty-one of them. A press release from the
  agency last February proudly noted that, in the first six weeks of 1996, Clinton
  had declared twenty-seven disasters--six times more than the average for the
  last twenty years, and three times more than the highest previous period over
  the last twenty years (1978). If Bob Dole somehow tightens the presidential 
  race
  this fall, one can almost expect Clinton to begin declaring "major disasters" 
  in
  key eastern states, where road surfaces will be endangered by a deluge of
  falling leaves.
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  It's no accident that Clinton has been able to derive political advantage
  from FEMA: the agency employs roughly ten times as many political appointees 
  as 
  other agencies its size. The agency has about 2,700 employees, as well as 7,000 
  
  workers on standby who can be called in case of a declared disaster. (This does 
  
  not include its use of AmeriCorps "volunteers," who, for example, 
  were brought
  in after the Oklahoma City bombing to distribute kneepads to rescue workers, 
  or 
  , after the Northridge, California earthquake, to go from door to door informing
  area residents of the benefits they could claim.)
 Proud as it is of reinventing government, the administration likes to talk 
  up
  its modernizing of FEMA. Agency director Witt told a Senate Appropriations
  Committee hearing on April 30, "The entire application for federal assistance
  can now be taken using a computer--a virtually paperless process that is more
  efficient and takes less time." Clinton himself bragged in February, "It 
  used to
  take a month or more for many people to begin receiving relief, and now people
  can call in to a 1-800 number and see those checks arrive within days." 
  (A
  toll-free number doesn't solve all problems, however. Though FEMA has
  established one in the wake of the Southern church fires, about the only advice 
  
  the agency has to offer is that churches get deadbolt locks for its doors, use
  better lighting, and install sprinkler systems.)
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  Its speed in doling out the goodies, however, masks the fact that FEMA is in 
  
  a state of virtually total financial and bureaucratic chaos. A 1995 report from 
  
  FEMA's Inspector General concluded: "Disaster Relief Fund financial data 
  are
  often unreliable_. Financial audits of the Fund have not been performed because 
  
  the systems, records, and lack of controls made the Fund unauditable." 
  The
  report went on to add: "Many accountants and analysts did not know what 
  their
  jobs entailed, and questioned their own value to the operation."
 The report also noted that the money FEMA has been so quick to give away is
  routinely misused. Money passed on to a local government to repair a parking 
  lot
  was used to purchase computer equipment instead; funds to fix damaged roads 
  and 
  utility lines were spent instead to build a school septic system--a project 
  that
  had nothing to do with the disaster that generated the federal aid. Perhaps
  most shocking, the report noted the agency routinely permits local government
  beneficiaries to keep any unspent funds.
 If local governments claim to have difficulty paying their small share of
  cleanup and relief costs, FEMA will provide them with a Community Disaster Loan.
  According to the 1988 federal disaster act, however, if a local government's
  revenues are insufficient to meet its budget three years after the disaster,
  then FEMA must forgive the debt. Local governments, in other words, have strong 
  
  incentives not to cut spending.
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  As a result, roughly 90 percent of all Community Disaster Loans have been
  forgiven--at a cost of over $150 million to U.S. taxpayers. Some governments
  even take the low-interest loans and buy higher-interest federal Treasury bills.
 Not surprisingly, the agency's generosity can slow a local community's
  response to disasters. Jeffrey Tucker, an editor at the Mises Institute in
  Auburn, Alabama, described FEMA's effect in the days after Hurricane Opal hit
  the city last year:
  
  Everything was being cleaned up--the city government going crazy--then it turned
  out that we might be eligible for disaster assistance. And everything came to 
  a 
  halt. The city stopped doing anything--everything froze--this went on for weeks.
  Trees were still in the streets. Why? Because FEMA people were coming through 
  to
  determine whether we needed aid. And in order to get aid, we had to leave the
  place looking trashed. Then--FEMA decided that it was a disaster.
 But, instead of starting to cleanup then, the city delayed further cleanup
  until it received FEMA money. The first half of the cleanup occurred in the
  first 24 hours--and the aid from FEMA simply made local government bigger. (1)
 
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  Just as with welfare, FEMA's free help tempts communities into becoming
  dependent on the feds rather than remaining self-reliant. Before Clinton took
  office, for example, only one blizzard had ever resulted in federal
  intervention. Now snow is routinely a "major disaster" that requires 
  FEMA's
  involvement; this winter alone, Clinton labeled sixteen states "major disasters"
  due to snow. Vernon, Connecticut, was given a FEMA emergency relief grant of
  $40,023 this past June to help the city cope with the cost of the preceding
  winter's storms. Yet the total cost for snow removal last winter amounted to
  $258,000--about $8.60 per person in the 30,000-population town, which is
  probably less than what the average householder would pay a 12-year -old to
  shovel out his driveway after a good snowfall.
 Because the town had only budgeted $104,516 for snow removal, however, it
  claimed to be overwhelmed by the heavy costs. What lesson did the town managers 
  
  deduce from FEMA's generosity? As the Hartford Courant reported, the "optimistic
  town council has already set the proposed 1996-97 snow-removal budget at
  $69,383, the lowest level in 15 years." Some local officials may believe 
  that
  having a low budget for snow removal--which is then exceeded--will make it
  easier for them to shake their tin cup in FEMA's direction.
 And, in predictable bureaucratic fashion, those towns that make a genuine
  effort not to be dependent on federal money virtually disqualify themselves
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  from ever receiving it in the event of a real disaster. Buffalo got hit with 
  36 
  inches of snow in one day last December--a heavier burden than any of the areas 
  
  that were labeled disaster areas in the following months. But the city's request
  for FEMA assistance was denied. Rep. Jack Quinn (R-N.Y.), the Republican from
  Buffalo, complained: "I got the impression that because we were good at 
  what we 
  did in terms of snow removal, we were almost penalized because of it."
  
  Yet while the Clinton administration could afford politically to snub Buffalo,
  it felt much more obliging about California after an earthquake rocked the
  Northridge region in January 1994. California is a key state in Clinton's
  re-election campaign--so FEMA swung into high gear to prove to constituents 
  that
  the president was on their side. More than 400,000 southern Californians
  received FEMA checks averaging $2,800. Thousands of unsuspecting homeowners
  received checks for $3,450 out of the blue. When the Los Angeles Times broke 
  the
  story of these unsolicited "accelerated disaster housing" payments 
  on February
  3, 1994, FEMA announced that same day that it would stop sending money to people
  who had not requested aid. However, FEMA spokesman Morrie Goodman denied any
  mistakes were made: "Anyone who says an error was made doesn't know what 
  they
  are talking about. We received very, very few calls from people who felt they
  didn't need the aid." He defended the policy: "We felt, as an agency, 
  it was
  better to send the check than to wait until we had inspectors out there." 
  Forbes
  reported last year that of these unsolicited checks, "6,590 went to families
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  whose homes weren't even damaged enough to be covered." Although FEMA eventually
  asked for the checks to be sent back, a spokesman says the agency can't say 
  how 
  many were returned.
 FEMA also permitted many homeowners to double-dip--that is, to collect both
  insurance payments for home damage as well as a hefty federal grant for the 
  same
  costs. Investor's Business Daily reported in May 1994: "FEMA shelter checks,
  which subsidize rent for alternative housing and cover up to $10,000 for minor
  household repairs, have been cut with no questions asked about resident's
  property insurance or income."
 FEMA's largesse naturally drew other agencies into the orgy of big spending. 
  
  In the aftermath of the Northridge quake, the Department of Housing and Urban
  Development sent a pack of officials to the region with thousands of Section 
  8
  certificates, good for 18 months of nearly-free housing for low- and moderate
  -income families. The vouchers entitled families to up to $1,391 a month to 
  rent
  a four-bedroom apartment. One woman proclaimed, "This is like Christmas," 
  after 
  using her certificate to move into a luxurious apartment complex with a heated
  swimming pool, four spas, six tennis courts, and two air-conditioned racquetball
  courts. Other voucher recipients, according to the Los Angeles Times, moved 
  into
  "the Churchill, a Mid-Wilshire district high-rise that bills itself as 
  a luxury 
  facility and offers an outdoor pool, Jacuzzi and a small gymnasium with
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  weightlifting equipment."
 Although the Times warned of a "financial aftershock" once the subsidies 
  ran 
  out, Congress and HUD repeatedly extended them for short periods of time.
  Finally, this May the Republican Congress made the temporary subsidies
  permanent--thereby providing a long-term windfall to those who had made the
  least effort to get off the dole. The Times also reported that one voucher
  recipient had quit her job because she could no longer get from her new
  subsidized apartment to her office without a car.
 FEMA matched HUD's largesse by bankrolling "repairs" at colleges 
  and other
  educational institutions when little or no damage was done. The Los Angeles
  Times reported, "If a single ceiling tile fell from a classroom, or a single
  light fixture was jarred loose, the entire [school or college] campus could
  qualify for more quake-proof ceilings or lights, courtesy of FEMA's mitigation
  fund. In L.A., many schools fit that bill."
 Prior to 1989, FEMA would only provide financial assistance to government
  agencies and public institutions to repair damage done during a declared
  disaster. Yet, as an Inspector General report noted last year, FEMA has "made
  some major changes to its regulations which may have increased the Federal cost 
  
  of disaster assistance. For example, the definition of 'current codes' was
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  changed to mean those codes adopted prior to project approval by FEMA versus
  those codes that were in effect at the time of the disaster. Also, FEMA changed 
  
  its regulations to reflect that a facility is eligible for replacement when 
  the 
  cost to repair disaster-related damages exceeds 50 percent of the cost of
  replacing the facility."
 While this may sound like an unimportant point, it has proved to be a bomb
  beneath the federal budget. FEMA has created a golden opportunity for "code
  racketeering" by local and state governments--raising their standards after 
  a
  disaster and sending the bill to Washington for the upgrades. FEMA now routinely
  bankrolls lavish new upgraded buildings to replace buildings that received a
  trivial amount of damage. The IG noted, "Based on damage repair costs in 
  recent 
  years, FEMA program officials now estimate upgrading costs to be between 50 
  and 
  1,000 percent (the majority being at the higher end) of the cost of repairing
  actual disaster damage." For example, it would have cost FEMA only $1.1 
  million 
  to repair quake damage to the University of Southern California Psychiatric
  Pavilion. Because code upgrades cost $44 million, however--more than half the
  price of the building itself--the agency constructed an entirely new pavilion,
  at a taxpayer cost of $64 million. Several representatives of private insurance
  companies interviewed by the inspector general expressed astonishment at FEMA's 
  
  policy.
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  According to a just-issued Inspector General's report, FEMA has also paid
  lavishly for repairs at profit-making sports stadiums and tony golf courses.
  After the Northridge quake, FEMA gave $5.5 million to repair the scoreboards 
  at 
  the California Angels' Anaheim Stadium, and $88 million for repairs and upgrades
  at the Los Angeles Coliseum. In the wake of flash floods, FEMA in 1993 provided 
  
  "$871,977 to repair erosion, cart paths and sprinklers at the Indian Wells 
  Golf 
  Resort in California and $246,102 to fix the fairways, greens, and cart paths 
  at
  the Palm Springs Golf Course." Such a visible and spend-happy presence 
  in the
  state has led to FEMA becoming almost a part of the local psyche. When Los
  Angeles held earthquake drills after the Northridge disaster, one comedian
  quipped: "The FEMA office even practiced processing bogus claims." 
  When the Los 
  Angeles Times sponsored a contest last year for the Top Ten Reasons David
  Letterman should move his TV show to Los Angeles, one of the top submissions
  read: "Two words: FEMA money!"
  
  Perhaps the most egregious violation of common sense that FEMA commits, however,
  is its penchant for encouraging people to build homes in unsafe areas. The
  agency regularly bails out those whose homes are destroyed in dangerous climes. 
  
  As an editorial in the Vancouver Columbian observed, "Most of the emergencies
  FEMA manages result from misguided efforts to take advantage of nature. People
  build near active volcanoes; FEMA comes in after the eruption. People build
  along hurricane-lashed seashores; FEMA is ready to save the day. People
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  thrust their habitat into wildfire zones; FEMA follows the fire trucks."
 One of FEMA's highest-visibility operations is the National Flood Insurance
  Program (NFIP). FEMA is running a national television advertising campaign
  (titled "Cover America") encouraging people to sign up for NFIP, in 
  which
  viewers are told: "We can't replace your memories, but we can help you 
  build new
  ones." Director Witt told a congressional committee in April that the ads 
  stress
  that "flooding can happen to almost anyone." Witt's observation would 
  be a
  surprise to many people living in deserts or on mountain tops. In reality,
  certain places are a hundred times more likely than others to be flooded. Yet
  FEMA generally charges a uniform insurance rate across the nation.
 In essence, NFIP amounts to a type of anti-environmental socialism. "The
  greater the coverage we can achieve," director Witt has said, "the 
  healthier the
  flood insurance program will be, and there will be less of a burden on the
  disaster program." According to one career employee at the agency, however, 
  "The
  way they advertise the flood insurance is disgusting. It is a Ponzi scheme --and
  they have to keep replenishing that sucker because it is running dry. The NFIP
  is amazingly generous. You are talking of up to $250,000 for property damage
  coverage for only $300 a year for people living in a flood zone--that is
  absurd." Adds Beth Milleman of Coastal Alliance, an environmental activist
  group: "What disaster relief and flood insurance wind up doing is giving
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  people the financial means to build or rebuild in exactly the same spot that 
  we 
  know is disaster prone. And it is no strings attached nine times out of ten."
 FEMA currently faces $250 billion of exposure from NFIP policies. The
  insurance fund ran out of money earlier this year, and FEMA had to borrow $600
  million from the U.S. Treasury to replenish it. Witt told Congress, "If 
  flooding
  incidents drop to a more normal level, we expect that we will pay the fund back 
  
  within five years." However, FEMA is essentially massively subsidizing 
  most of
  the people who buy the policies--and the more policies that FEMA sells, the
  greater the financial crash-and-burn will be when Mother Nature catches up with 
  
  the agency.
 Until then, Bill Clinton will continue to score easy political points with
  his extravagant giveaways. Congressional Republicans have been completely
  toothless in opposing FEMA's politicization, having neither the gumption nor 
  the
  willpower to challenge the barrage of "snow disasters." About the 
  only eruption 
  from the Grand Old Party came from Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge- -who threw 
  a
  public anti-Clinton snit when he wanted a bigger portion of his state declared 
  a
  flood and snow disaster zone. (Such political fortitude has led him onto the
  short list of running mates Bob Dole is considering.)
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  The GOP's failure to fight against Clinton's transformation of FEMA into what
  amounts to a re-election office marks 1996 as even more likely a year of
  Republican defeat. Indeed, in crucial California, FEMA last summer took out 
  a
  three-year lease of office space in Pasadena. And the administration keeps
  finding ways to give grants to the state, and thereby keep its "compassion" 
  in
  the news. On July 17, Leon Panetta, James Lee Witt, Los Angeles mayor Richard
  Riordan, and L.A. Board of Supervisors chairman Mike Antovich announced $264
  million in new FEMA grants for the city's government buildings and private
  hospitals, including $126 million to upgrade city hall. No emergency there, 
  of
  course--but without vocal Republican opposition, Clinton was able to spin the
  announcement into yet another tale of his administration's effectiveness and
  even patriotism: "Los Angeles City Hall is not simply the offices of the 
  mayor
  and city council, but a nostalgic icon of the city, rich in history and a symbol
  of one of America's most important cities. I'm pleased that the federal
  government can help in the effort to restore this beautiful building." 
  (In the
  words of the Los Angeles Times, the generous federal aid "could mean a 
  fancier
  project than envisioned.")
 Meanwhile, when genuine disasters do strike, Clinton continues to see them 
  as
  contributing to his political good health; after the explosion of TWAFlight 
  800 
  , he announced plans to push Congress to allow FEMA to respond to "airplane
  crashes." A disaster for you means a chance for him to spit-shine his image 
  as
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  First Comforter. As he told a group of disaster workers in February:
  
  I'll never forget when James Lee Witt and I were in Woodland, Washington, a 
  few 
  days ago. We came upon a 70 year old man, and he and his wife had lost
  everything in the flood. He had even lost his hearing aid. And he looked at 
  me
  and he said, "Well, I'm 70 years old and I've never had a president shake 
  hands 
  with me before. It was nearly worth losing my home to do that at my age." 
  And I 
  thought to myself I wished that spirit could kind of somehow capture America.
 "Nearly worth" losing your home for the chance to shake Bill Clinton's 
  hand? 
  No wonder he wishes that "spirit" would "capture" America. 
  By throwing around
  tens of millions of taxpayer dollars, the First Comforter may even get his wish.
  
  (1.) After Tucker's boss, Llewellyn Rockwell, wrote an op-ed in the Los Angeles 
  
  Times criticizing the adverse effects of FEMA's intervention, Morrie Goodman,
  the agency's director of public communications, went ballistic. He called Tucker
  and declaimed, "I gave you a $100,000 grant" to study emergency warning 
  systems 
  in Alabama last year. (The grant, in fact, had been given to Auburn University.)
  After Tucker wrote about Goodman's call, Goodman left a message calling him 
  "a
  very sick and dangerous human being." In due course, a Witt-appointed
  The American Spectator, September, 1996 
  
  management review board recommended that Goodman should be removed from office. 
  
  In response, Witt simply moved Goodman to a new post- -director of strategic
  communications--where he continues to draw his $100,000+ salary. Meanwhile, 
  FEMA
  continues to list him as director of the Office of Emergency Information and
  Public Affairs.